ECONOMIC VALUE-ADDED IN THE MALAYSIAN LISTED COMPANIES: A PRELIMINARY EVIDENCE

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ABSTRACT

This study examines the nature and characteristics of Economic Value-Added (EVA) in 100 largest non-financial companies listed on the Malaysian stock exchange, and to assess its impact on stock value. The evidence suggests that, in general, the EVA has a superior influence over firms' market values compared to the traditional accounting measures such as the earnings per share. Its superiority becomes more apparent when regression tests are conducted separately for companies with positive EVA (value creators) and those with negative EVA (value destroyers). There is a strong positive relationship between EVA and market values for value creators, while the relationship is negative for value destroyers. The negative relationship for value destroyers is inconsistent with expectations and may be sample and period specific.

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management's preoccupation with growing in size rather than in value, However, as competition for

fact that their investments provide returns below their cost of capital

INTRODUCTION

In recent years, Economic Value Added (EVA) has gained significant attention as an alternative to traditional accounting measures for use in corporate performance, company valuation as well as incentive compensation. Much of this publicity may be attributed to a September 20, 1993 article in the Fortune magazine (Tully 1993), which mentions that that managers and investors are handsomely rewarded when they consider EVA in their decisions. EVA is touted as being today's hottest financial idea and getting hotter, and EVA is praised for its strong link to stock prices (Tully 1993).

The EVA, however, is not a new concept. The need to earn more than the cost of capital is actually one of the oldest ideas in business (Hamilton 1777, Marshall 1890). EVA is a variant of the residual income concept, which has been around a long time but in many different forms. Marshall (1890) defines residual income as total net gains less the interest on invested capital at the current rate. In short, residual income is the after-tax operating profit minus a charge for invested capital.

See for example, (Edey (1957), Edwards and Bell (1961), Kay (1976), Peasnell (1982), and Feltham and Ohlson (1995)).

It was not until the late 1980s that Joel Stern and Bennett Stewart begin popularising the EVA idea.² Stewart (1991) describes EVA as the only measure that tie-in directly to intrinsic market value and the fuel that fires up a premium in the stock market value. Stewart (1991) advocates that EPS should be abandoned, and net income (NI), NI growth and EPS are misleading measures of corporate performance. Ehrbar (1998) lends support by stressing that when EVA becomes the focus for all decisions, it establishes clear and accountable links between strategic thinking, capital investments, operating decisions and shareholder value.

Essentially, proponents of EVA have made two major assertions, that is (1) EVA better explain stock returns and company values than the traditional accounting measures like EPS and ROE, and (2) they better motivate managers to create shareholder wealth. If these assertions are true, then managers should use EVA as a tool for capital budgeting decisions while investment analysts and investors should use EVA to measure corporate performance and value companies.

This study examines the nature and characteristics of Economic Value-Added (EVA) in 100 targest

The value creation concept also has major implications for companies. The Asian financial crisis in 1997 and 1998 points to the existence of value destroyers, that is, companies having negative EVA due to the fact that their investments provide returns below their cost of capital. This is partly due to the top management's preoccupation with growing in size rather than in value. However, as competition for capital intensifies globally, it is expected that the market will drive the emphasis on shareholder value.

value destroyers. The negative relationship for value destroyers is inconsistent with expectations and

Furthermore, academic research on EVA, especially on Malaysian companies, remains sparse. Studies conducted overseas especially on U.S. companies, for instance, on the impact of EVA on MVA have produced mixed results. This study hopes to contribute to the small but growing body of research on EVA.

recentive compensation. Much of this publicity may be attributed to a Scotember 20, 1993 article in the

The objectives of this study are to examine the nature and characteristics of EVA in large Malaysian companies listed on the local stock exchange, and to compare the impacts of EVA and traditional accounting measures like EPS on stock value. Stock value is measured using a market-based measure, the Market Value Added (MVA).

The EVA, however, is not a new concept. The need to earn more than the cost of capital is actually one

 $^{^2}$ They register EVA as a trademark of Stern Stewart & Company, a consulting firm that is based in New York City.

MARKET VALUE-ADBED

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the EVA framework. Section 3 presents a review of past studies on EVA. Section 4 discusses the research methodology while Section 5 provides and reports the empirical results. Finally, Section 6 concludes the study.

THE EVA FRAMEWORK

Stewart (1991) defines EVA as the net operating profit after tax (NOPAT) in excess of a capital charge taken by the company. Companies that earn NOPAT in excess of the cost of invested capital will have positive EVA. These companies are referred to as "value creators". Those that earn NOPAT less than the cost of invested capital will have negative EVA, and are referred to as "value destroyers".

EVA can be calculated using the following formula:

EVA = NOPAT - Capital Charge

EVA = NOPAT - (Invested Capital x WACC)

NOPAT is profit arising from a company's operation after depreciation and taxes but before interest and non-cash entries like goodwill amortisation and deferred tax reserve. Indeed, NOPAT is the total pool of profits available to provide a cash return to all financial providers of capital to the company.

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Stewart (1991) defines invested capital as total assets minus non-interest bearing current liabilities. Alternatively, invested capital is the amount of debt and equity capital, plus other liabilities in a company. According to Stewart (1991), this is the sum of cash invested in a company's net assets over its life, without regard to financing form, accounting name or business purpose. The cost of capital is measured by the weighted average of cost of capital (WACC).

company. The EVA, on the other hand, is the internal measure that is most closely refined to MVA

In practice, computing EVA is far more elaborate depending on the number and type of adjustments made to both Net Income and equity in order to arrive at NOPAT and invested capital respectively. These adjustments are made in order to overcome accounting distortions in the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) practices such as the use of last-in, first-out (LIFO) versus first-in, first-out (FIFO) accounting for inventory, full cost versus successful effort accounting, amortisation of goodwill, treatment of research and development (R&D) costs, and deferred taxation. The adjustments

generating a stream of negative EVA will lead to lower MVA, which will cause stock priocs to

are also made to ensure a fairer measure of assets employed in the business and that the profits are only those arising from the core business. Stewart (1991) has developed over 160 proprietary adjustments in order to arrive at NOPAT and invested capital.

1998) lends support by stressing that when EVA becomes the focus for all decisions. It

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MARKET VALUE-ADDED

Another performance measure that is frequently used in conjunction with EVA is the Market Value Added (MVA). Stewart (1991) defines MVA as the difference between the total market value of debt and equity of a company and its invested capital. Since in most instances it can be assumed that the market value of debt is equal to its book value, MVA is therefore solely dependent on the market value of equity. Market value of equity is usually determined by multiplying the number of shares outstanding by its market price. e EVA as a root for capital budgeting degrad/04milyn0 mT46M046t-4N3Dats and investors

The MVA measure indicates how much value a company has created or destroyed from its shareholders' capital. Successful companies will generate positive MVA and this implies that the company has created value for its shareholders in the long-term. Unsuccessful companies will generate negative MVA and this means that the company has destroyed the value of capital invested by its shareholders in the long-term. MVA, used as a corporate performance measure, therefore fits well with the primary goal of management that is to maximize shareholders' wealth.

Alternatively, invested capital is the amount of debt and equity capital, plus other liabilities in a

THE LINK BETWEEN EVA AND MVA

According to Stewart (1991), MVA is also equal to the market's estimate of the net present value (NPV) of all future EVA. MVA is an external measure that captures the long-term wealth creation potential of a company. The EVA, on the other hand, is the internal measure that is most closely related to MVA. Rearranging the MVA equation, the relationship between MVA and EVA can be expressed as: made to both Net Income and equity in order to arrive at NOPAT and any and a NVM = AVM

$$MVA = NPV$$
 of future EVA

$$= EVA_1/(1+k)^1 + EVA_2/(1+k)^2 + \dots$$

where k is the opportunity cost of capital. This means that companies generating positive EVA should see a rise in their MVA, which in turn should drive up stock prices. Companies generating a stream of negative EVA will lead to lower MVA, which will cause stock prices to decline.

LITERATURE REVIEW in Situation Transported build violation in the results of the contract of t

Previous studies in this area are mainly focused to determine the association between EVA and MVA, and whether EVA is a better measure of performance compared to the traditional accounting measures.

However, these studies produced mixed results.

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The earliest study was by Stewart (1991). His study is based on 613 U.S. companies and data from 1984 to 1988. Stewart finds a striking relationship between EVA and MVA, and between changes in EVA and changes in MVA. For the group of companies with negative EVA, the correlation is less evident. Until EVA becomes positive, market values are decoupled from current internal measures of performance. Stewart claims that adopting the goal of maximizing EVA and EVA growth will ultimately build a premium into the market value of company. In a follow-up study, Stewart (1994) adds that EVA stands out well among the other key performance measures as the single best measure of wealth creation on a contemporaneous basis.

Stewart's conclusions are strongly supported by O'Byrne (1996) and Ehrbar (1998). O'Byrne (1996) studies the relationship between capitalized EVA and NOPAT with market value of the firm. He finds that EVA has a far greater explanatory power to market value compared to other operating performance measures. Ehrbar (1998) makes similar conclusions from his studies. Using the Stern Stewart Performance 1,000 database, he finds that EVA statistically explains about 50% of the movement in a company's MVA.

past flow measures such as cash ROI instead of making the smake in constitueined as a sale trigita a cital

Other independent studies that support the use of EVA include those by Grant (1996), Lefkowitz (1999), Lehn and Makhija (1996), and Milunovich and Tsuei (1996).

Grant (1996) states that EVA has a significant impact on a company's MVA. In order to neutralize the size effect, Grant studies the relationship between MVA and EVA, using the Stern Stewart Performance 1,000 database for the year 1993. Grant finds that about 32% of the movement in MVA for the U.S. large-capitalization companies is explained by variations in EVA. He also finds that the relationship is

O'Byrne's (1996) study, Biddle, Bowen and Wallace find that EVA's superiority does not exist

Both are employees of Stern Stewart & Company. By Holls 1992 1992 1992 1992 1992 1992

very strong for value creators compared to value destroyers. For the fifty largest U.S. wealth creators at year-end 1993, the regression yields an R-square of 83%.

and whether EVA is a better measure of performance compared to the traditional accounting measures.

A somewhat similar study is conducted by Lefkowitz (1999). But Leftkowitz concentrates on change in MVA as opposed to the annual amount of MVA used by Grant. He uses the same data set, the Stern Stewart Performance 1,000 database, for the year 1996. Lefkowitz's study reveals that there is evidence of a significant positive linear relationship between EVA and the annual change in MVA.

changes in MVA For the group of companies with regardy EVA the constant on 1875s evident that

Lehn and Makhija (1996) support the view that EVA and MVA, like the traditional accounting measures, are effective measures of performance and signals for strategic change. Their study centres on 241 U.S. companies and data in 1987-1988 and 1992-1993. Though not by a large difference, the correlations of both EVA and MVA with stock returns is slightly higher than the correlation of the other traditional accounting measures like return on equity, return on assets and return on sales. They conclude that EVA has a slight edge as a performance measure.

In studying the computer industry, Milunovich and Tsuei (1996) find that EVA correlates better with MVA (adjusted R-square = 42%) than other accounting measures like EPS growth (adjusted R-square = 34%) and EPS (adjusted R-square = 29%).

Performance 1,000 database, he finds that EVA statistically explains about 50% of the movement in a

Slewer's conclusions are throughy supported by O' flynne (1996) and Ehrare (1998). O'Elynne (1996)

On the other hand, there is a group of researchers who do not support the contention that EVA is a superior corporate performance and valuation measure. They include Biddle, Bowen and Wallace (1997, 1999), Chen and Dodd (1997), Clinton and Chen (1998), Yau (1996), Peterson and Peterson (1996), and Kramer and Pusher (1997).

Biddle, Bowen and Wallace (1999) state that relative information content tests reveal that net income to be more highly associated with returns and firm values than EVA. Using a sample of 6,174 firm-years over the period 1984-1993, Biddle, Bowen and Wallace find that net income explains about 13% of market-adjusted returns, compared to EVA (adjusted R-square = 6.5%). Replicating and extending O'Byrne's (1996) study, Biddle, Bowen and Wallace find that EVA's superiority does not exist. In fact the net income regression has a higher association with firm value (adjusted R-square = 53%) than the EVA

Stewart's adjustments for accounting distortions show some marginal evidence of being incrementally important, this difference does not appear to be economically significant.

Chen and Dodd (1997) acknowledge that EVA measures provide relatively more information than traditional accounting measures in terms of the strength of their associations with stock returns. However, Chen and Dodd state that EVA and residual income are highly correlated and are almost identical in terms of association to stock return. Although their study indicates a slight increase in the explanatory power of EVA compared to residual income, they feel that the gain is too small to be meaningful. They suggest that implementing performance measures based on residual income may be more than adequate and bring about the same benefits at a lower cost.

Clinton and Chen (1998) report evidence that suggests companies may be better off focusing on simple cash flow measures such as cash ROI instead of making the costly EVA adjustments. This is because the ordinary cash flow measure produces results as good as the EVA in terms of its association with stock value.

K = R + B(R - R)

Yau (1996) studies the EVA and MVA of ten property companies listed on the Stock Exchange of Singapore from 1991 to 1993 using the nonparametric Wilcoxon statistical test. Yau finds that both EVA and traditional accounting measures produce relatively similar results and hence, concludes that there would be no value added in using EVA and MVA measures over traditional accounting measures.

This study is conducted along the lines of the lines of the lines of the study is \$11999) research. The

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CALCULATION OF EVA AND MYA

A total of 100 companies listed on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange over the period 1992 to 1996 provide the database for this study. The sample is based on the largest non-financial companies listed on the exchange according to their market capitalization as at December 31, 1996. This listing is obtained from the Investors Digest, January 1997.

regression. The following six regressions are run for the whole sample, as well as for the value

Data such as EPS and those used for the computation of EVA and MVA are obtained from the KLSE Annual Companies Handbooks and the annual reports of the respective companies. Share prices are obtained from the KLSE Daily Diary and Bloomberg. They are corrected for rights issue, bonus issue and stock splits.

The interest rates on debt are obtained from the respective companies' annual reports. In computing the cost of capital, where available, the average interest rates on the company's debt is taken as the cost of debt, taking into account the corporate tax rate.

explanatory power of EVA compared to residual income, they feel that the gain is too small to be

Chen and Bodd (1997); acknowledge that EVA measures provide relatively more information shard

The cost of equity is calculated using the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM).

$$K_c = R_f + \beta (R_m - R_f)$$

Where $K_c = \cos t$ of equity, $R_f = \sin t$ free rate, $R_m = \cot t$ market return and $B = \cot t$. Malaysia's average 3-month Treasury Bills rate is used as the proxy for the risk free rate. This data is obtained from the Ministry of Finance Malaysia's Economic Report. The market return is computed based on a 15-year historical return on the KLSE Composite Index (KLSE CI) from 1981 to 1996, which is about 12.6%.

The beta values for the companies are obtained from the KLSE Beta Book 1994. The same beta for each company is used to compute the respective cost of equity for each of the five years. This study assumes that the beta values for companies are stable over the five-year period.

doe no value added in using EVA and MVA measures over traditional accounting measures

MVA (adjusted R-square = 42%) than other accounting measures like EPS growth (adjusted R-sq

This study is conducted along the lines of Grant's (1996) and Lefkowitz's (1999) research. The relationships between EVA and MVA, and EPS and MVA are studied using the OLS simple and multiple regression. The following six regressions are run for the whole sample, as well as for the value creator

ide the database for this study. The sample is based on the largest non-financial companies listed and the largest non-financial companies listed and the largest and largest trained not ample as the largest listing is obtained as at December 31, 1996. This listing is obtained

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and value destroyer samples.

- 1. MVA = a + bEVA + e
- 2. MVA = a + bEPS + e
- 3. MVA = a + bEVA + cEPS + e

Add to layested capital

- 4. $\Delta MVA = a + bEVA + e$
- 5. $\Delta MVA = a + bEPS + e$
- 6. $\Delta MVA = a + bEVA + bEPS + e$

where:

MVA = MVA divided by invested capital

EVA = EVA divided by invested capital

EPS = earnings per share

AMVA = Annual change in MVA

CALCULATION OF EVA AND MVA

As mentioned in an earlier section, EVA is arrived at by taking the net operating profit after tax (NOPAT) and adjusts it against the capital charge. The capital charge is calculated by multiplying the Invested Capital with the weighted average cost of capital (WACC). The formula used is as follows:

9. Remarking costs without off a costate of Cumulan of resmonth costs

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EVA = NOPAT - (Invested Capital x WACC)

Detailed adjustment formula for the variables are shown in the box below:

NOPAT ISM LEDGE OF THE SET TO GO SET	Invested Capital V 19 ham 10 a	But in term
the NI to equity 100000 actives/gailband	tor represented in the triupale is the	largest sec
+ Increase in equity equivalents	+ Equity equivalents am 3d ni	companies
Adjusted NI	Adjusted equity	E WAYA IS
+ Preferred dividend	+ Preferred stock	mid ruture
+ Minority interest provision	+ Minority interest	a positivo
+ Interest expense (net of tax)	+ Long- and short-term debts	* These an

Adjusted NI

Equity equivalent adjustments

Ac	ld to NOPAT	Add to invested capital	18
In	crease in equity equivalents	Equity equivalents AVM	
1.	Exceptional loss/(gain) after tax	Cumulative exceptional loss / (gain) after tax	
2.	Fixed assets write-down	2. Cumulative fixed assets write-down	8
3.	Loss / (gain) on disposal of fixed	3. Cumulative loss / (gain) on disposal	100
	assets and investments	of fixed assets and investments	
4.	Increase / (decrease) in bad debt	4. Cumulative increase / (decrease) in	
	and stock obsolescence reserve	bad debt and stock obsolescence	15
5.	Increase / (decrease) in prov for	5. Cumulative loss / (gain) for	3
	diminution in value of investments	diminution in value of investments	A
6.	Goodwill amortisation	6. Cumulative goodwill amortisation	
7.	Trademark amortisation	7. Cumulative trademark amortisation	1
8.	Increase in deferred tax reserve	8. Deferred tax reserve	1
9.	Restructuring costs written-off	9. Cumulative restructuring costs	
10	Increase in LIFO reserve	10. LIFO reserve	
11.	. Increase in net capitalized intangible	11. Net capitalized intangibles	
12	Increase in full cost reserve	12. Full cost reserve	100
侧上电	al charge is calculated by multiplying th	13. Unrecorded goodwill	

RESEARCH RESULTS

5.1 Sample Characteristics

Table 1 shows the representation of the sample in terms of the number of companies and market value sectors. The 100 largest companies represents about 28.5% of the total number of firms on the exchange. But in terms of market value, the sample constitutes about 71% of the total market capitalization. The largest sector represented in the sample is the trading/services sector that contains the 3 largest companies in the market.⁴

⁴ These are Telekom Malaysia, Tenaga Nasional and Sime Darby.

Table 2 shows the distribution of profitable and losing companies as well as those with positive and negative EVA over the years of study. Although most of the large Malaysian companies are profitable during the period 1992 to 1996 as shown by the positive EPS, the majority of these companies are in fact value destroyers given their negative EVA. Over the five years, the percentage of value destroying companies ranges between 57% and 65% while the percentage of value creating companies ranges between 35% and 43%. The results reveal that 19% of the companies are able to generate positive EVA for five consecutive years as opposed to 35% of the companies generating negative EVA for five consecutive years.

applies. Comparing Tables 3a and 3b, for the years when the relationships are significant, the

regression on everage produces a higher R-squared than the EPS regression. This suggests that EVA

The very high percentage of profitable large Malaysian companies (positive EPS) during 1992 to 1996 is to be expected given that this period coincides with the unprecedented economic boom enjoyed by Malaysia. Over the five-year period, Malaysia's economy grew at an average 8.7% annually. However, when it comes to creating value, a majority of these companies fail to live up to shareholders' expectations. This is shown by the fact that the average number of positive EPS firms over the years of study is 97.6%, yet the average number with positive EVA is only 38.5%. The negative EVA implies that these companies fail to earn a rate of return that exceeds their opportunity cost of capital.

coefficients for the EVA are significant while those for EPS are not, it should also be mentioned that the AVA in the ordered so an appropriate of AVA as according to the multiple regression is only marginally improved compared to the earlier simple.

Regression Analysis with MVA as Dependent Variable

Table 3a, 3b and 3c show results of regression equation 1, 2, and 3 respectively. Table 3a shows that EVA's explanatory power on MVA, as shown by its R-squared, is inconsistent of over the years. In some years EVA has good explanatory power, for example in 1992, 1994 and 1995. In other years the R-squared is very small and the relationship is not significant. The relationship is also not significant for the 5-year period (R-squared 0.2%). The overall results shown in Table 3a do not seem to be very encouraging in terms of supporting an expected positive relationship between EVA and MVA. In 1994, the relationship runs in the opposite direction. It is significantly negative.

Both the positive and negative relations between EVA and MVA can be explained as follows. MVA is calculated from market price, which, in an efficient market should take into account present and future profits of the company, whereas the EVA is a short-term historical measure of performance. A positive relationship will be obtained to the extent that EVA reflects future profits. A company with negative EVA

could still have a positive MVA if the stock market expects a turnaround in the near future. Likewise, a company with positive EVA may have a negative MVA if the market expects the company to face poorer prospects.

Table 3b reports the results of regression equation 2 between EPS and MVA for the period 1992 to 1996. The results show a poorer fit between the two variables compared to those in the previous table. Since the EPS used in the regressions are also historical values, similar explanation as those given for Table 3a applies. Comparing Tables 3a and 3b, for the years when the relationships are significant, the EVA regression on average produces a higher R-squared than the EPS regression. This suggests that EVA is a better predictor of MVA than EPS.

to be expected given that this period coincides with the unprecedented economic boom enjoyed by

Table 3c shows the results when both the EVA and EPS variables are combined into a multiple regression. The results for the overall sample show a significant relationship between each of the two variables and MVA. However, the relationship is negative for EVA and positive for EPS. For the years that show significant relationship, EVA seems to dominate EPS. For example, in 1992 and 1995, the coefficients for the EVA are significant while those for EPS are not. It should also be mentioned that the R-squared of the multiple regression is only marginally improved compared to the earlier simple regressions. This shows that the EVA and EPS may have similar influence on MVA.⁵

The results in this section points to the superiority of EVA, compared to EPS, in explaining variations in MVA. These results support some of the previous proponents of EVA. However, one problem with our results is that it is inconsistent over time. In some years the relationship is significant, while in other years it is not. Additionally it is also inconsistent in terms of the direction of the relationship: in some years it is positive while in other years it is negative.

Table 3a, 3b and 3c show essults of regression equation 1, 2, and 3 respectively. Table 3a shows that

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 $^{^5}$ The correlations between EVA and EPS are found to be 0.40 for the entire sample, and it ranges from 0.23 to 0.56 on year-to-year basis.

Regression Analysis with DMVA as Dependent Variable 318 293 bits AV 3 ind 1250 gue indi

Following Lefkowitz (1999), three regressions that use annual change in MVA as dependent variable are run. This variable can be thought as the rate of growth of the MVA. These regression examine the extent which the MVA growth rate is influenced by the EVA and/or the EPS. Table 4a, 4b, and 4c present the respective results of regression 4, 5 and 6.

Table 4a shows that during the five-year period study, the EVA has a negative influence on the growth in MVA. For the annual regression, the table shows significant relationship in three out of five years, i.e., 1994, 1995 and 1996. During the years where the explanatory power is significant, the relationship is negative.

destroyers far outnumbered the wealth creators. These results beginne companies are take a closi

at the viability of their investment projects,

researchers have discovered that the two samples behave differently in terms of the explanatory po

It is expected that under normal situation, the relationship between the EVA and MVA growth would be positive, implying that a large EVA should be accompanied by a positive growth in MVA. However, the inverse relationship in 1994 and 1996 implies that high EVA is associated with low MVA growth. This can be explained as follows: although a company is presently generating positive EVAs, the the stock market is anticipating the companies' EVA to deteriorate in the future, hence a negative growth in MVA. Another plausible explanation of the inverse relationship, particularly in 1994, is because of the stock market correction in 1994 after the strong run-up in share prices the year before. With most share prices closing lower by end 1994 compared to their peak prices at the beginning of 1994, the number of companies with a negative annual change in their MVA rose to 47 compared to 13 in 1993.

The results of regression 5 between EPS and the annual change in MVA are reported in Table 4b. The results clearly show that there is a very poor fit between the EPS and MVA growth. Although two of the annual regressions show a significant relationship, i.e. 1992 and 1995, the R-square is very small. The regression for the whole period is not significant, and the R-square is zero. Compared to the earlier regression on MVA and EPS (Table 3b) this regression exhibits a poorer fit.

between EVA and MVA. The explanatory power of the EVA has also increased substantially in this

Table 4c presents the results of the regression of MVA growth against both the explanatory variables, the EVA and EPS. Over the five-year period, the explanatory power seems to have increased compared to the simple OLS regressions reported in Tables 4a and 4b. These results confirm the earlier findings

the adjusted R-square is quite low at 11.9%. Annually, the regression results show significance for

to which the MVA growth rate is influenced by the

that suggest that EVA and EPS are poor predictors of the annual change in MVA for the period 1992 to 1996, although the EVA factor has an edge over EPS.

run. This variable can be thought as the rate of growth of the MVA. These regression examine the extent

Regression Analysis for Wealth Creators

companied by a positive growth in MVA. However, the

This section discusses the regression results for the wealth creators and wealth destroyers. Previous researchers have discovered that the two samples behave differently in terms of the explanatory power of the EVA on MVA. In order to examine if our sample exhibits similar behaviour, the total sample is divided into wealth-creator sample (those with positive EVA) and wealth-destroyer sample (those with negative EVA). The wealth creators range from 35 companies in 1992 to 43 in 1995. The wealth destroyers range from 57 companies in 1995 to 65 in 1992. It seems that for all the years of the study, the wealth destroyers far outnumbered the wealth creators. These results beg the companies to take a closer look at the viability of their investment projects.

All six regressions are run for each of the subsample. However, from the foregoing discussion, it seems that the results for EPS regressions and the combined EVA and EPS regressions are less useful. Hence these are not reported in this paper.⁶

Table 5a presents the regression results between EVA and MVA for the wealth creators. The results show that the regressions are statistically significant in each of the five years and for the whole five-year period. The results are also consistent in indicating the existence of a strong positive linear relationship between EVA and MVA. The explanatory power of the EVA has also increased substantially in this sample. The R-squares range from 41.1% in 1992 to 83.3% in 1995. For the overall sample the R-square is 58.8%. This finding compares favourably with our earlier results and with other studies.

The regression results between EVA and the annual change in MVA for the wealth creators are presented in Table 5b. Over the five-year period, the regression equation is statistically significant, but the adjusted R-square is quite low at 11.9%. Annually, the regression results show significance for the years 1993, 1994 and 1995. It is also interesting to note that all the significant relations are positive as opposed to the predominance of the negative relations in for the total sample (Table 4a).

annual regressions show a significant relationship, i.e. 1992 and 1995, the R-square is very small.

⁶ The results of regressions 2,3, 5 and 6 are available from the authors.

Construction

Regression Analysis for Wealth Destroyers

Table 6a reports the regression results between EVA and MVA for the wealth destroyers. It can be seen that there is a sharp contrast in the results for the value destroyers compared to those for value creators.

First, the relationships are significant only in some of the years, as well as for the overall period. Second, and most interesting, the significant relationships are consistently negative. The same observations also apply to the regressions between the MVA growth and EVA as shown in Table 6b.

Table 1 Distribution of sample and its representation by sector, agos

The negative relationships between MVA and EVA for value destroyers indicate that the market interprets the negative EVA as a temporary phenomenon and expects them to turn around in the near future. In addition companies suffering large losses (large negative EVA) are expected to bounce back more than the companies with small losses.

CONCLUSION

This study aims at examining the nature and characteristics of Economic Value-Added (EVA) in large Malaysian companies listed on the local stock exchange, and to assess its impact on stock value. Stock value is measured using a market-based measure, the Market Value Added (MVA). EVA is essentially the profits gained over and above the charge for the opportunity costs of capital invested. The data used for this study is 100 largest non-financial companies as measured by their market values as at the end of 1996. The period of study is 1992 until 1996.

The evidence generated indicates that, in general, the EVA has a superior influence over firms' market values compared to the traditional accounting measures such as the earnings per share. Its superiority becomes more apparent when regression tests are conducted separately for companies with positive EVA (value creators) and those with negative EVA (value destroyers). There is a strong positive relationship between EVA and market values for value creators, while the relationship is negative for value destroyers. The negative relationship for value destroyers is inconsistent with expectations and may be sample and period specific.

This study supports that the EVA has its merits for use in corporate performance and valuation measures in Malaysia. The results of the study serve as early indication that managers should take into account the opportunity costs of using capital in a particular business activity. The results are consistent with the contention that EVA drives firm values.

Table 1 Distribution of sample and its representation by sector.

Provide the regressions between the MVA growth and EVA as shown in Table 6b

and most interesting, the significant relationships are consistently negative. The same observations

Sector and Association are a	No. of companies	Market cap. (RMm)	Market cap.
Consumer products	20 (35.1%)	57.8 (78.1%)	squit 14.0 militarini
Industrial products	21 (25.0%)	48.8 (46.7%)	abither 8.11 mics
Construction	7 (29.2%)	41.9 (78.5%)	10.2
Trading services	26 (38.8%)	204.8 (88.4%)	49.8
Hotels (1) bobbA-sulaV or	3 (50.0%)	4.4 (77.7%)	dy aims al examin
Properties	12(19.1%)	24.5 (42.3%)	neasured using a
Plantations Payai Inligate	10 (25.0%)	25.5 (61.1%) word	gained ov 6.0 and a
Mining Child 1921 Em 1	1 (10.0%)	4.0 (39.1%)	1.0 stybus
Total	100 (28.5%)	411.6(71.1)	100.0

Note: The percentage in the bracket denotes its representation in terms of number of companies and market value respectively.

r compared to the multional accounting measures such as the earnings per share, its superiority subject to the manufacture of the superiority of the subject of the subject of the subject of the subject of the positive feature of those with negative EVA (value destroyers). There is a strong positive

ionship between EVA and market values for value creators, while the relationship is negative for the control of the control of

the adjusted R-square is quite low at 11.9%. Annually, the regression renders show significance

years 1993, 1994 and 1995. It is also interesting to note that all the significant relations are g

species to the predominance of the negative relations in for the total sumple (Table 4a)

Table 2 Distribution of companies by the signs of EVA and EPS

Year	0.477 0.000	Posit EVA	ive	157 877	Negative EVA	0.600 PSE 1	otal
1992	2,584	35	38	1.6	65	0.110	00
1993	TOTAL	39		9.1	61	3,496	00
1994	1.65	38	7	39	62 (93.1)	0.027	00
1995	0.06/07	43	0	Rác .	57 oosta(4	28602	00
1996		38			62	1	00
Year	000,03	Posit EPS	ive	175	Negative EPS	2288	Cotal COL
1992	311.708	95	11	34	5 *(ENISTY?	0,000	00
1993	CACO. The t-sta	97	o Jone coeffi	0.0. cient is	3 own in coren	LYE.C.	00
1994	Significa	99	<0.05 are i	ndicated	Ty (06.0-)	1	00
1995	O.135 Empire	99	C Or PENTESS	0.2 upo noi	AVW il noils	2.554 2.564 2.3648 =	00
1996	й,	98	76,	Ove	2 (OčNa)alue	p-value	00
EVA	1066	ezadinanag n	LAVEAR RE	efficient 2 Mai	of the slope cor		Cotal
Posi	tive EVA	(5 consecuti					9
Neg	ative EVA	(5 consecut	ive years)	1.8	1.90	0.155	5
N		-15,415	0.113	35.8	- 28.56	0.000	100
		(-7,04) ⁸	(4.27)*	- 15			
	2,929	16.696	-0.020		57.14	.0.000	100
		(9.71)*	(-1.78)		100		
		-2.068				0.119	
		(-1.29)	(2.06)				
	1,355	-3.684		5.6	15.82	0,000	500
		(-3.57)*	(5.41)*				

EVA OIL

Table 3a Results of regression equation 1: MVA = a + bEVA + e

Year	into T a	Negative Negative	Adj R²	F-value	p-value	N
1992	1.329	11.714	33.8	51.54	0.000	100
	001	(7.18)*		EE.	92	-
1993	3.496	3.351	1.8	2.85	0.094	100
1	001	(1.69)		96	- P0	CF .
1994	3.368	-13.300	24.5	33.11	0.000	100
OLERENIE	_ 00i	(-5.75)*	0	7.5 (10.15) 7.5 (10.15)	14.0	11-
1995	2.288	14.967	52.1	108.67	0.000	100
oustruc	10001	(10.43)*	arameterinetis	1.9 (78.389)	92 241	91
1996	2.373	-0.427	0.0	0.09	0.762	100
lote is	001	(-0.30)		A C77 7989	. 1.1 10	PI I
1992-96	2.554	-1.456	0.2	2.24	0.135	500
In talia	100an	(-1.50)		5.5(61.189)	62 89	01

Positive EVA (5 consecutive years) (%7.85) 001

Notes: 1. The t-statistic of the slope coefficient is shown in parentheses.

Note: The percentage in the bracket denotes its regarded window heart) wive was said

^{2.} Significant values at p<0.05 are indicated by an *.

Table 3b Results for regression equation 2: MVA = a + bEPS + e

Year	pula pulue	F-dalue	Adj R ²	F-value	p-value	N
1992	0.477	0.041	15.7	19.50	0.000	100
1992	689-888	(4.42)*	3/30	2096	9999 2	2100
1993	2.584	0.038	1.6	2.60	0.110	100
ant and	(1.61)					
1994	1.644	0.071	3.9	5.03	0.027	100
	(2.24)*	(0.13)		(0.17)		
1995	1.005	0.042	8.5	10.24	0.002	100
DE LA COLONIA DE	(3.20)*	*0.01	- W	190000	0.13.3	100
1996	1.856	0.013	1.6	2.66	0.106	100
001-	(1.63)	20.01	8.7.	3.008	-0.171	1005
1992-96	1.708	0.031	3.4	18.47	0.000	500
	(4.30)*	(3.20)*		(3.23)*		

2. Significant values at p<0.05 are indicated by an *.

Table 3c Empirical results for regression equation 3: MVA = a+bEVA+cEPS+e

Year	a ₃	b 3(i)	b ₃	Overall	F-value	p-value	N
		(0.	Adj R ²	*((-7.97		
1992 1.066	1.066	10.279	0.014	34.5	27.08	0.000	100
	Significar	(5.39)*	(1.44)	eene er vroes 2.05 ansladie	values at ps.	L. Significant	100007
1993 2.9	2.923	2,413	0.025	1.8	1.90	0.155	100
		(1.09)	(0.98)				
1994 0.331	0.331	-15.415	0.113	35.8	28.56	0.000	100
		(-7.04)*	(4.27)*				rice office to
1995	2.929	16.696	-0.020	53.1	57.14	0.000	100
		(9.71)*	(-1.78)				
1996	1.597	-2.068	0.019	2.3	2.18	0.119	100
		(-1.29)	(2.06)				
1992-96	1.355	-3.684	0.043	5.6	15.82	0.000	500
		(-3.57)*	(5.41)*				

Notes: 1. The t-statistic of the slope coefficient is shown in parentheses.

2. Significant values at p<0.05 are indicated by an*.

Table 4a Empirical results for regression equation 4: $\Delta MVA = a + bEVA + e$

Year	91H54 Q	900 6-9	Adj R²	F-value	p-value	N
1992	0.229	1.982	0.7	1.75	0.189	100
100	0.11.0	(1.32)	1.6	0.038	2.584	1993
1993	2.378	0.274	0.0	0.03	0.865	100
		(0.17)			(2.24)*	
1994	0.797	-17.697	45.1	82.49	0.000	100
001	0.106	(-9.08)*		£10.0	1.856	9661
1995	0.171	3.928	8.7	10.46	0.002	100
ione	3 203	(3.23)*	70	non s	*(4.30)*	
1996	0.682	-3.190	14.9	18.30	0.000	100
1092-06	2.554	(-4.28)*	0.2	224	. 0.135	500
1992-96	0,822	-6.364	11.1 11.1 13.0	63.56	0.000	500
ses L	The t-statisti	(7.07)*		ibA in parenth	ekes .	

100	0.155	1,90	1.8	0.025	2413	2.923	
				(89.0)	(90.1)		
001	000.0	28.56	35.8	0.113	-15415	0.331	994
				(4.27)*	(-7.04)*		
001 0	0.000	57.14	53.1	-0.020	16.696	2.929	995
				(-1.78)	(9.71)*		
100	0.110	2.18	2.3	0.019	-2.068	1.597	966
				(2.06)	(-1.29)		
500	0.000	15.82	5.6	0.043	-3.684	1,355	992-96
				(5.41)*	(-3.57)*		

Table 4b Empirical results for regression equation 5: $\Delta MVA = a + bEPS + e$

Year	oulav-ra 91	Overall d F-value	Adj R ²	F-value	p-value	N
1992	-0.068	0.015	3.2	4.26	0.042	100
001	0.121	(2.06)*	\$10.0	0.522 = 1	-0.038	7.661
1993	2.316	0.025	0.0	0.02	0.894	100
100	Paris	(0.13)	AVEN AV	(04/5)	10.00	
1994	0.186	0.031	0.1 bgo.o	0.95	0.333	100
1001	1 100	(0.97)	(3.67)%	*(22.01%)	0.000	46
1995	-0.358	710.0	3.2	4.24	0.042	100
1996	1,911	(3.20)*	55(0.36)	*(04(6)	0.000	38
1996	000 0.840	10.01 0.003	0.6800.0	0.45	0.506	100
(992-96	1.690	(1.63)	59(\$3.1)	*(0014s)i	0.000	19
1992-96	000.0.744	0.006	0.0300.0	0.76	0.384	500
Notes	1. The Y-stati	(0.87)	perfict(Fc.b)s	now/(8% (c) rent		

^{2.} Significant values at p<0.05 are indicated by an *. is applied in a string in a string

Table 4c Empirical results for regression equation 6: ΔMVA = a+bEVA+cEPS+e

Year	aualy-q	P. Mide	CIANNE,	Overall	F-value	p-value	N.Y
900	290,00	8282	350	Adj R ²		salo.1889	(9)2
1992	-0.038	0.522	0.014	3.2	2.16	0.121	100
UNIV	10078	(0.30)	(1.59)	6/095		AP#65	760)
1993	2.347	0.223	0.001	0.0	0.02	0.984	100
TUQU	1/307	(0.12)	(0.07)	82.46		0.000	.100
1994	-1.454	-19.265	0.084	51.4	53.25	0.000	100
		(-10.23)*	(3.67)*	(16.0)			
1995	0.060	3.629	0.003	8.7	5.25	0.007	100
		(2.46)*	(0.36)	(3.20)*			
1996	0.354	-3.884	0.008	16.3	10.64	0.000	100
		(-4.56)*	(1.63)	(1.63)		×	
1992-96	-0.014	-7.920	0.030	14.5	43.47	0.000	ae 500
		(-9.28)*	(4.57)*	(0.87)			

^{2.} Significant values at p<0.05 are indicated by an *.

Table 5a Results of regression equation 1 for wealth creators: MVA=a+bEVA+e

Year	a	b of AV	Adj R ²	F-value	p-value	N
1992	0.728	22.508	41.1	24.69	0.000	35
		(4.97)*		(-0.29)		
1993	1.303	34.991	69.8	88.89	0.000	39
81	0.023	(9.43)*	511	4.730	0.11.0	1004
1994	2.130	14.586	61.2	59.35	0.000	38
46	000,0	(7.70)*	24.5	5,830	-0.300	1995
1995	1.399	20.040	83.3	225.92	0.000	46
		(15.03)*		(-0,82)		
1996	1.911	11.645	59.4	55.05	0.000	38
	etgarli	(7.42)*	oofficient is	o of the slope o	iteitere-t-ogF	Notest
1992-96	1.690		58.8	279.84	0.000	196
		(16.73)*				

^{2.} Significant values at p<0.05 are indicated by an *.

Table 5b Empirical results regression equation 4 for the wealth creators:

Year	a	b	Adj R ²	F-value	p-value	N
1992	0.679	-1.541	2.8	0.08	0.774	35
	-0.038	(-0.29)	0.014	82*(784) 2.16	0.121	100
1993	0.383	24.945	61.9	62.86	0.000	39
		(7.93)*				
1994	-0.410	4.730	11.2	5.66	0.023	38
38	000.0	(2.38)*	(0.0219	14.586	2.130	1661
1995	-0.300	5.830	24.5	15.63	0.000	46
		(3.95)*	0.49084			
1996	0.829	-0.751	0.9	0.68	0.416	38
	0.060	(-0.82)	0.003	8.7(80.81) 5.25	0.007	lo.
1992-96	0.307	5.845	11.9	27.29	0.000	196
		(5.22)*	The same of the sa			15.50

2. Significant values at p<0.05 are indicated by an *.

Notes: 1. The t-statistic of the slope coefficient is shown in parentheses.

Significant values at p=0.05 are indicated by an *.
 Significant values at p=0.05 are indicated by an *.

Table 6a Results of regression equation 1 for wealth destroyers MVA=a+bEVA+e

Year	a	b st AVE	d Adj R ² AV	M/F-value	p-value	N
1992	0.405	-1.463	0.1	1.08	0.303	65
		(-1.04)		(16.1)		
1993	01.513	-7.253	28.3	24.65	0.000	61
	, ta (150, 2 ₀ s)	(-4.97)*		(-5.23)	anti a	LOGI
1994	0.005	-30.481	86.8	400.57	0.000	62
and annue S4	1660	(-20.01)*	61	0.028	0.122	1995
1995	1.205	-3.926	0.0	1.02	0.317	54
	es E. Bodd ((-1.01)	ic Valued A	(£0.63)	rical Example	ellup of
1996	0.579	-12.116	59.0	88.91	0.000	62
a. Dengla	s B, and Shi	(-9.43)*	(8), "Do Ne	v (20,014) mano	e Measures	Meisure
1992-96	0.230	-17.895	53.7	352.19	0.000	304
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^{2.} Significant values at p<0.05 are indicated by an *.

Table 6b Empirical results regression equation 4 for the wealth destroyers

N	p-value	$\Delta MVA = a + bEVA + e$			R	Ymir
Year		b	Adj R²	F-value	p-value	N ₁
1992	0.114	1.514	2.4	2.58	0.113	65
		(1.61)		(PU/1=)		
1993	01.107	-7.212	30.5	27.38	0.000	61
		(-5.23)		*(4.07)*		
1994	-1.731	-31.063	86.5	391.95	0.000	62
	U00.0	(-19.80)	8.08	108.00-	COOL	188
1995	0.122	0.028	1.9	0.000	0.994	54
	0.11.7	(0.01)	0.0	3.026	1,205	200
1996	0.088	-6.422	33.5	31.74	0.000	62
		(-5.63)		(10.1-)		
1992-96	-0.635	-16.611	48.5	286.15	0.000	304
	II - S.	(-16.92)		4753.0.1		

Notes: 1. The t-statistic of the slope coefficient is shown in parentheses.

2. Significant values at p<0.05 are indicated by an *.

^{2.} Significant values at p<0.05 are indicated by an *.

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